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Abstract 
The paper attempts to test the following hypotheses: (i) Are people generally self 
interested, (ii) If people tend to be generous, what is the motive, i.e., either they 
fear rejection or do they have a preference for fairness, and (iii) Is there any 
behavioral difference in bargaining between males and females. 
In this respect, we conduct an ultimatum bargaining experiment in a “same 
gender pairings” setting in International Islamic University Islamabad, Pakistan. 
In order to test the first hypothesis we look at the overall offers made by the 
proposers and the rejection rates of the responders. In order to test the second 
hypothesis we compare the offers that proposers anticipate will be accepted by 
the responders and the offers they actually make. If actual offer exceeds the 
minimum acceptable offer anticipated by the proposer, we conclude that he is fair 
minded. Otherwise, he is being generous due to fear of rejection. In order to test 
the third hypothesis, we compare the offers and responses made by males and 
females in this game.  
At the start of this study, we were of the view that the people of an Islamic 
society, in general, and students of International Islamic University, Islamabad, in 
particular, would show a greater concern for fairness rather than fear of rejection. 
As is evident, the results of this study prove these views wrong. Further, this fear 
of rejection was very realistic, particularly, in case of males where the rejection 
rates for unfair offers were very high. 
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Regarding gender differences, we have found females to be more generous than 
males. However, the reason for this generosity could not be found, since there 
was no significant difference in the degree of fairness or fear of rejection in the 
two genders. We also did not find any conclusive evidence that females are more 
reciprocal than males. 
 
 
1. The Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study is to test the following hypotheses: 
1. Are people generally self interested 
2. If people tend to be generous, what is the motive, i.e., either they fear 
rejection or do they have a preference for fairness 
3. Is there any behavioral difference in bargaining between males and 
females, i.e.,  
a. Are females more generous than males 
b. If yes, then what is the motive 
c. Are females more reciprocal in their behavior than males 
 
In this respect, we conduct an ultimatum bargaining experiment in a “same 
gender pairings” setting. In order to test the first hypothesis we look at the overall 
offers made by the proposers and the rejection rates of the responders. In order 
to test the second hypothesis we compare the offers that proposers anticipate 
will be accepted by the responders and the offers they actually make. If actual 
offer exceeds the minimum acceptable offer anticipated by the proposer, we 
conclude that he is fair minded. Otherwise, he is being generous due to fear of 
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rejection. In order to test the third hypothesis, we compare the offers and 
responses made by males and females in this game.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the 
importance and contribution of Experimental Economics to the field of 
Economics. In the third section we discuss the general concept and usage of the 
ultimatum game. In the fourth section we present the relevant literature review. 
The next two sections discuss the design and results of our experiment. 
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2. Why Experimental Economics 
 
The study of Economics is moving from logic, positivism and field observation to 
one of experimentation under controlled conditions. As Weibull (2002) notes 
“Moving from arm-chair theorizing to controlled laboratory experiments may be 
as important a step in the development of economic theory as it once was for the 
natural sciences to move from Aristotelian scholastic speculation to modern 
empirical science”. 
 
The dialogue between theory and empirical work is the engine of scientific 
progress (Kuhn's shift in paradigm). Economics and other social sciences base 
their empirical investigation on natural events. Sometimes these might not be 
present or give confused signals. Then the task to address causality could be 
faced with two kinds of solutions: statistical and scientific. Experimental 
Economics refers to the scientific solution while standard econometric techniques 
are statistical solutions. 
 
In this respect, Experimental Economics provides a powerful tool for the analysis 
of the rational choice foundations of traditional Economics. Over the last few 
decades, much has been achieved to explore to what extent economic agents 
conform to traditional assumptions, and what alternative views may be fruitfully 
explored. Also, Experimental Economics yields a formal and replicable system 
for analyzing alternative market structures before they are actually implemented. 
 
Experiments take place in a controlled economic environment. By economic 
environment we mean individual economic agents together with an institution 
through which agents interact. Agents are economic because they are real 
people following real rules and looking at real payoffs. The control is both on 
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characteristics of the agents and on institutions. The subjects are characterized 
in the Experimental context by their economically relevant characteristics. Some 
characteristics are controlled directly and others must be controlled indirectly. 
 
Most experiments in Economics tend to feature performance related payoffs due 
to several important reasons. One is that experimentalists usually want subjects 
to pay attention to, and be thoughtful about the tasks they are set. Performance 
related payoffs provide one mechanism for encouraging participants to attend 
and think. Incentive mechanisms are often also designed with the explicit 
intention of eliciting honest, as well as, thoughtful responses. But there is, 
perhaps, an even more basic rationale for the use of performance related 
incentives in a wide range of economic experiments. Specifically, incentives 
provide a tool for the experimenter to create specific choice situations in which 
subjects are then observed making real choices. 
 
Smith (1994) cites the following seven reasons due to which Experimental 
Economics is fast becoming a growing sub-discipline in Economics. 
1. Test a theory, or discriminate between theories. 
2. Explore the causes of a theory’s failure. 
3. Establish empirical regularities as a basis for new theory. 
4. Compare environments. 
5. Compare institutions. 
6. Evaluate policy proposals. 
7. The laboratory as a testing ground for institutional design. 
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Experimental Economics became an autonomous field of research after World 
War II in concomitance with the increasing interest in Microeconomic theory. The 
VonNeumann-Morgenstern's Expected Utility Theory gave a lot of opportunity to 
test behaviour trough lotteries (Allais Paradox, 1953, etc). In 1952 the 
Conference of Santa Monica grounded Experimental Economics on more 
theoretical basis and gave to the discipline an autonomous methodological 
structure. Experimental Economics evolved in three areas: 
 
1. Market experiments: Pioneering studies in this area were 
a. Chamberlin’s (1948) Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
b. Smith’s (1962) Double auction experiments 
 
2. Game experiments: Revolutionary analysis in this area were 
a. Tucker’s (1950) Prisoner’s dilemma 
b. Nash (1950) Equilibrium  
 
3. Individual choice experiments: Initial studies in this area were 
a. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1947) theory of choice under 
uncertainty 
b. Expected Utility Theory 
c. Choice of an uncertain lottery over a certain payment 
 
In the last two decades Experimental Economics has widened its scope to cover 
various other economic issues mainly along these sets of experiments: 
1. Public goods (Prisoner's dilemma and free riding) 
2. Coordination (Games with multiple equilibria and the role of learning) 
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3. Bargaining behavior (Inefficient outcomes of bargaining) 
4. Market organization and competitive equilibrium (Different forms by which 
exchange might be regulated) 
5. Auction markets and disequilibrium behaviour (Test of game theoretic 
prescriptions, individual choice behaviour and violations of rational 
expectations behaviour). 
 
In present times Experimental Economics is a well developed field within 
Economics. It has its own methodological practices, its own association (The 
Economic Science Association) that runs annual conferences, its own journal 
(Experimental Economics), and now its own Nobel Laureates (Vernon Smith and 
Daniel Kahneman, winners in 2002). 
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3. Why Ultimatum Game 
 
Fair divisions of gains from trade are commonly observed in daily life. They occur 
even in the case of bargaining among two asymmetrically placed parties, one of 
whom holds a clear strategic advantage over the other. In addition to the 
substantial anecdotal evidence to this effect, the numerous experimental studies 
since the early 1980s have shown that fair outcomes play a truly focal role in 
bargaining situations. 
 
Today most authors appear to agree on at least three major robust, yet 
unexpected, empirical regularities that arise in bargaining games. First, proposed 
divisions accumulate around the 50-50 division, that is, the actual outcomes are 
“more fair” than the usual prediction. Second, rejections, which should never be 
observed on the equilibrium path, occur in significant numbers. Third, more often 
than not, subjects who reject an offer make a disadvantageous counteroffer, that 
is, after rejecting a proposal that would leave them with x dollars; they propose a 
new division that spares them less than x dollars. Clearly, all of these 
observations are in contrast with the standard game-theoretic predictions, 
thereby putting bargaining theory, which has significant applications in the fields 
of industrial organization and international trade, on a hot seat. 
 
The stylized form of negotiation known as the “ultimatum game” was first studied 
by experimental economists in Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982), and 
economists got a surprise. In the experiment, proposers offered their opponent 
on average 36.7% of the pie (ranging in size between 4 and 10 DM), while one 
offer of 30% (1.20 DM out of 4 DM) was rejected. These results went completely 
against the usual economic assumption of self interested individuals (explained 
later). 
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More than twenty years after its inception, the ultimatum bargaining game 
emerges as by far the most intensely studied experimental game. The game has 
been replicated in many environments, manipulating monetary stakes, gender, 
race and (more recently) species. 
 
The format of the ultimatum game is as follows: 
1. There are two players, the proposer and the responder. 
2. The proposer is offered a sum of money by the experimentor. 
3. He then has to offer the responder a fraction of that money.  
4. If the responder accepts, they each get their agreed-upon share. 
Otherwise, neither gets anything. 
5. There is no negotiation. Therefore, either the Responder takes the deal or 
he doesn't.  
 
Some regard ultimatum game as one of the classic demonstrations of human 
irrationality. The rational (game theoretic) analysis of the game is simple. The 
responder has the choice of whatever the proposer gave him or Rs. 0. Clearly, 
anything at all is better than nothing. Thus, we would expect the responder to 
take whatever the proposer offers him. Knowing this, we would expect the 
proposer to offer the minimum amount, (e.g. Rs. 10 or even lower if possible) to 
the responder. 
 
The experimental studies of the ultimatum game reflect that results deviate from 
this backwards induction point (Nash Equilibrium) predictions. When people play 
the ultimatum game in the lab, in a large number of human studies conducted 
with different incentives in different countries, the majority of proposers offer 40-
50% of the total sum, and about half of all responders reject offers below 30%. 
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Now, it is not irrational for proposers to offer higher amounts. After all, if they 
know that responders will reject lower amounts, that's very rational. However, as 
shown above, it is irrational for the responder to reject the proposed division. So, 
why do they do it?  
 
A common interpretation is that responders’ behavior expresses that they would 
rather forgo some money than be treated unfairly (reciprocity). On the other 
hand, proposers’ behavior is understood as one combining two motives; some 
taste for fairness and the anticipation that small offers may be turned down (fear 
of rejection) (Thaler, 1988).  
 
To answer this question Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994) compare 
offers in the ultimatum game with offers in a simpler game called the dictator 
game. In the dictator game, the players who make the offers get to keep their 
share no matter what. Sure enough they make less equal offers, and keep more 
of the pie for themselves, thus indicating that their generous behavior can be 
attributed more to fear of rejection than to fairness.  
 
Further, in ultimatum games in the laboratory, gender has been observed to 
influence a variety of decisions. For instance, Eckel and Grossman (2001) 
demonstrate chivalry (men accept lower offers from women than from men) and 
solidarity (women accept lower offers from women than from men). Solnick 
(2001) finds, in contrast, that players of both sexes demand more from women 
than from men. Both studies report that offers were lower to women than to men, 
and that offers from women and men were not significantly different. 
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4. Literature Review 
 
A key insight from over two decades of Experimental Economics research is that 
people typically do not behave as selfishly as traditional Economics assumes 
them to do. An experimental game that produced very convincing evidence in 
this regard is the ultimatum game.  
 
As mentioned earlier, in the first ultimatum game experiment by Güth, 
Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982), proposers offer their opponent on average 
36.7% of the pie, while one offer of 30% is rejected. 
 
Other important studies conducted in this respect are mentioned below. 
 
Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994) find 47% of the pie being offered by 
the proposers. 
 
Bolton and Zwick (1995) report a mean offer of 24% by the proposers with a 
quarter of them offering close to an equal split. The Rejection rate was found to 
be 38% with almost three quarters of the unequal offers being rejected. 
 
Croson (1996) finds that among twenty six pairs of players, the mean offer was 
45% with more than half of the proposers offering close to the equal split 
distribution. All offers less than 30% were rejected. 
 
Buchan, Croson and Johnson (1999) find among 11 participants in Japan an 
average offer of 51% when the total pie equals US$ 50. 
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Henrich (2000), reports an average offer equal to 26% among 21 participants in 
Peru who each had to divide US$ 160 with their opponent. 
 
Oosterbeek, Sloof and Van de Kuilen (2004) report the findings of a meta-
analysis of 37 papers with 75 results from ultimatum game experiments and find 
that on average the proposer offers 40% of the pie to the responder. On average 
16% of the offers is rejected. 
 
It has been investigated whether differences in offers are caused by differences 
in the amount of money that is at stake. Results tend to reject this as an 
explanation. Studies in which raising the stakes in ultimatum games was the 
explicit focus typically find no significant differences in the shares offered, while 
the rejection rate decreases as the stakes are increased (Cameron 1999; Munier 
and Zaharia 1998; Slonim and Roth 1998; List and Cherry 2000). 
 
Another explanation for variation in average offers and rejection rates across 
studies points to gender differences.  
 
Woman seems to differ from man in mental disposition, chiefly in 
her greater tenderness and less selfishness.... Man...delights in 
competition, and this leads to ambition which passes too easily into 
selfishness (Charles Darwin, 1874) 
 
By the mid-1980s, the leading experimental researchers in negotiation had 
tossed the gender variable into a heap of discarded individual difference 
predictors, ranging from race to authoritarianism which had failed over scores of 
tests to produce consistent results. As Lewicki and Litterer (1985) conclude 
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“From what is known now, it does not appear that there is any single personality 
type or characteristic [including gender] that is directly and clearly linked to 
success in negotiation”. 
 
Contemporary feminist ideals of minimalist sex differences further reinforced this 
perspective. Much of the relevant feminist research of that era sought “to shatter 
stereotypes about women’s characteristics and change people’s attitudes by 
proving that women and men are essentially equivalent in their personalities, 
behavioral tendencies, and intellectual abilities” (Eagly, 1995).  
 
There remained, however, recurrent indications from the field that gender could 
materially affect negotiations. For example, the experiences of men and women 
entrepreneurs indicate that in 1999, women entrepreneurs in the U.S. started 
40% of new businesses, yet made only 9% of total investment deals, and 
garnered a mere 2.3% of investment dollars (Almer, 2000; Rosenthal and 
Rodrigues, 2000). 
 
There are multiple explanations offered for the gender gap, ranging from quality 
of life choices to ownership preferences (Prakash, 2000). However, some 
observers with direct experience point to differences in the way men and women 
entrepreneurs have approached their negotiations with prospective investors. 
 
Perhaps for related reasons, salary negotiations are another arena in which 
gender gaps are well documented (Gerhart and Rynes, 1991; Kolb and Putnam, 
1997; Stevens, Bavetta, and Gist, 1993). Laboratory and field studies suggest 
that women tend to enter salary negotiations with lower pay expectations, which 
are then ultimately fulfilled. One field study of MBA salary negotiations found that 
males negotiated significantly higher increases on initial salary offers than did 
female peers (Gerhart and Rynes, 1991). 
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Other studies suggest that many men and women assume that gender 
differences in negotiation exist and that they act consciously or unconsciously 
upon that assumption. One experiment based on an ultimatum game showed 
that, when the bidders knew their partner’s gender from a simple name cue, both 
males and females made significantly lower (more competitive) offers to female 
respondents (Solnick, 2001).  
 
Business Week publicized the conclusion from this study that, “Despite 
significant increases in women's relative wages in recent decades, both sexes 
may still feel that women will accept lower pay than men and that women are 
more malleable in a bargaining situation”. 
 
Similar results to the ultimatum game experiment were obtained in a separate 
study based on a trust game, in which parties may withhold or exchange back 
and forth a growing pot of money. When the initial passing party, whether male or 
female, knew the receiving party was male, the money was passed significantly 
more often than when the receiver was female (Croson and Buchan, 1999). In 
another recent study of MBA classroom negotiations over a real-estate sale, 
male and female sellers reported setting significantly higher intended initial offers 
when assigned to negotiate with female as opposed to male buyers (Riley, 
2000). Similarly, field investigations of car sale negotiations have demonstrated 
that, controlling for the buyers’ appearance and bargaining script, male and 
female dealers made higher first and final offers to female than to male buyers 
(Ayres, 1991). 
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There have been two major streams of research on gender in negotiation. The 
first surged and largely subsided with trends in psychological research on 
individual differences in the 1970s and 1980s. The second emerged as a feminist 
critique of the negotiation field in the 1990s. 
 
The original wave of psychological research on gender as an individual 
difference in negotiation rested on the premise that gender would be a stable and 
reliable predictor of bargaining behavior and performance. Researchers tested 
whether female negotiators would be more cooperative and less self-interested 
than their male peers (e.g., Calhoun and Smith, 1999; Dawes, McTavish and 
Shaklee, 1977; Elliott, Hayward, and Canon, 1998). These studies and numerous 
others produced an assortment of seemingly contradictory findings. 
 
In the 1990s, leading feminists within the negotiation field offered an alternative 
conceptualization of the role of gender as “a belief system that structures and 
gives meaning to social interactions” (Kolb and Putnam, 1995). They argued that 
this “androcentrism” (Bem, 1993) perpetuated a hierarchical relationship in which 
“male experience becomes the norm and feminine is seen as different” (Kolb and 
Putnam, 1995). The feminist literature has enriched the field by challenging 
scholars and practitioners to reevaluate taken-for-granted views of negotiation, 
but this work has not provided a theoretical basis for advancing the empirical 
investigation of gender effects. 
 
The hypothesis that demographic variables influence economic and strategic 
behavior is not new among economists. Dating back at least to Rapoport and 
Chammah (1965), experimenters have tested in the laboratory for differences in 
behavior between men and women in situations involving salient monetary 
incentives. The study by Rapoport and Chammah is an early example in a long 
series of studies that employ variations of the prisoner’s dilemma game to test for 
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such differences. More recently, researchers have turned to public goods, 
ultimatum, and dictator experiments. 
 
Using variations on the prisoner's dilemma, some studies find women to be more 
cooperative or generous (e.g. Aranoff and Tedeschi, 1968; Meux, 1973; and 
Ortmann and Tichy, 1996); others find men to be more cooperative (e.g. 
Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Kahn, Hottes and Davis, 1971; and Mack, 
Auburn and Knight, 1971); yet others find inconsistent or no significant difference 
between the sexes (e.g. Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee, 1977; Stockard, Van Dc 
Kragt and Dodge, 1988; and Orbell, Dawes and Schwartz-Shea, 1994). Mason,  
Phillips and Redington (1991) find no gender difference in a duopoly experiment. 
In public goods experiments, Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) find women 
contribute significantly less than men, while Nowell and Tinkler (1993) report 
significantly higher contributions by groups of women than by mixed-sex or all-
male groups. Bolton and Katok (1995) find no differences between the behavior 
of men and women in dictator games. 
 
Research in every other social and behavioral science, on the other hand,  
indicates substantial differences in the behavior of men and women in non-
economic settings (for example, in psychology, studies in moral behavior, game 
playing, and helping behavior find consistent sex differences (Eagly and Crowley, 
1986; Gilligan, 1982; Uesugi and Vinacke, 1963; and Vinacke, 1959). In 
sociology, studies find sex differences in criminality and illicit and prescribed drug 
use (Cooperstock and Parnell, 1982; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Kandel and 
Logan, 1984; and Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985). Studies in political science 
report the development of a “gender-gap” in political behavior. Since the 1980 
elections, women, relative to men, have shown a bias towards Democratic 
candidates. Women's voting behavior is driven more by social issues than that of 
men (Baxter and Lansing, 1983; Christy, 1987; Goertzel, 1983; and Moore, 
1996). 
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The general conclusion drawn from this work is that women are more socially-
oriented (selfless) and men are more individually-oriented (selfish). If these 
differences survive in economic decisions, when money is at stake, then theories 
that model agents as homogeneous, or drawn from a common distribution, may 
predict behavior inaccurately. If instead, the differences in behavior are 
overwhelmed by monetary incentives, then economic decisions are 
fundamentally different from those examined in other social and behavioral 
sciences. 
 
Real life observation indicates that males and females are treated differently in 
the work place (McPherson & Hirsch, 1995, and Lazaer & Rosen, 1990). Can the 
root of such differences be found in different decision-making behavior? Until 
recently, relatively few experimental Economics papers reported data on such 
matters, but in the past few years this line of research has become more popular. 
Researchers have examined which of the two sexes is more fair or generous, or 
compared the discriminatory behavior of men and women, to mention a few 
examples. 
 
Eckel and Grossman (1996) examined gender differences in a punishment 
game, where subjects could choose to divide evenly a $10 (or $12) pie with 
someone who had previously been generous with another subject, or a $8 pie 
with someone who had previously been ungenerous. They found that women 
were at least as likely as men to punish ungenerous counterparts by choosing to 
divide the $8 pie. 
 
Eckel and Grossman (1998) use a dictator experiment in which the dictator is 
asked to determine the division of $10 between himself/herself and an 
anonymous respondent. Their results show that women are more generous to 
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their partners than men: women donate, on average, about twice what men 
donate. They apply various tests in this regard including a z-test (of the 
hypothesis that men and women's mean donations are equal), a median test (of 
the hypothesis that the two populations have the same median donation), a 
contingency table test (of the hypothesis that the probability of a specific donation 
being made is independent of the dictator's sex), the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
and the Epps-Singleton test (of the hypothesis that there is no difference in the 
distributions of donations made by men and women), and Logit analysis on the 
data.  
 
Eckel and Grossman (1999) have observed, the findings regarding gender seem 
to be conditional on the level of risk present in the experiment. In decisions 
where risk is involved, such as for the proposer in ultimatum games, there 
appear to be no systematic differences in behavior across genders. However, for 
decisions involving no risk, such as for dictators or punishers, women tend to be 
more generous and socially oriented in their behavior.  
 
Croson and Buchan (1999) examine gender differences in bargaining using the 
trust game introduced by Joyce Berg et al. (1995). There are two main results of 
this experiment. First, there is no significant gender related difference in the 
amounts sent by proposers. Second, women responders return significantly more 
than male responders, even controlling for the amount received.  
 
They give two explanations of why female responders return more than male 
responders. First, it may simply be that women are more altruistic than men (i.e., 
women care more about their partner's consumption than men do), and thus they 
return a higher proportion of their earnings. However, if this were so one would 
expect to see a significant gender effect in both amounts sent and proportion 
returned, not only in the latter. 
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Alternatively, the authors suggest that a different motive, reciprocity, could be 
driving the differences between male and female behavior in this setting. This 
explanation involves women being more likely to reciprocate than males, rather 
than being simply more altruistic. 
 
Botelho, Hirsh and Rutström (2000) use experimental data collected in Russia 
and in the United States using a simple ultimatum game. They find that the 
average offer made by female subjects in the two countries equals about 45% of 
the pie, and the median offer is 48.8% and 42.5% in the United States and 
Russia, respectively. Corresponding figures for male subjects are 31.5% in the 
United States and 35.3% in Russia, while the median offer is 30% in both 
countries. Further they report that, irrespective of the offer range, female subjects 
in both the United States and Russia exhibit substantially higher rejection rates 
than male subjects. 
 
Eckel and Grossman (2001) test the effect of gender and gender pairings in the 
ultimatum game. They find that although women proposers are more generous 
then men, the difference is statistically weak. Further, they observe systematic 
differences in the behavior of men and women, i.e., women are significantly more 
cooperative; the probability that a woman will accept a given offer is higher than 
for a man. 
 
They also find that context is important. The sex of the respondent's partner has 
a strong effect on the subject’s decision in the sense that women both reject and 
get rejected less frequently (solidarity between women) and that male 
respondents do not usually reject unfair offers by female proposers (chivalry 
among men). 
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Solnick (2001) uses the ultimatum game to suggest that both males and females 
tend to offer less to women seemingly expecting women to be content with less. 
However, as indicated by the higher minimum acceptable offers chosen by 
females, this expectation seems to be wrong footed. Further, both genders set 
their minimum acceptable offers higher when they are facing a female proposer 
thus indicating that they expect more generosity from females as compared to 
males.  
 
Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) compared gender behavior in dictator games 
and found that women gave more overall and were more likely to divide tokens 
evenly despite different monetary values, while men became less generous as 
the value of their tokens increased relative to the value of the responder’s tokens. 
It may be that women are more altruistic when the costs and benefits of giving 
are symmetric, but men may be more altruistic when the benefit of giving is 
higher than the costs. 
 
Specifically, Andreoni and Vesterlund find that, while women give significantly 
more when costs and benefits are symmetric, when the value of giving is three 
times the cost of giving, men give significantly more than women. 
 
The authors conclude that there are systematic differences by sex, and that 
these can have important and interesting consequences for economic behavior. 
Further, the results have implications for experimental methodology. In particular, 
experimenters may need to take greater care in assuring that their studies are 
gender balanced, and that findings are due to economic factors and not the 
gender composition of their samples 
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Andreoni and Petrie (2004) consider a linear public goods game and show that, 
on average, women are no more or less cooperative than men. Although men 
give roughly 15% more than women, it is not significant. However, men play the 
extremes significantly more than women. Men contribute zero tokens 27.7% of 
the time, but women do so only 16.3% of the time. Women also contribute all of 
their tokens only 9.4% of the time, compared to men who do so 22.1% of the 
time. 
 
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2004) examine whether a single sex group of only 
males will coordinate differently than a group of only females and report that no 
difference in behavior between females and males was found. 
 
The authors also raise a methodological issue, i.e., is there a bias in the research 
community against reporting or publishing results that document the absence of 
a gender effect? If so, there is a risk of bias in perceptions regarding the 
magnitude and limits of gender differences. 
 
They conclude that results are somewhat mixed, and since results do not always 
point in the same direction it is too early to draw far-reaching conclusions 
regarding the behavioral differences of men and women. 
 
Eckel and Grossman (forthcoming) provide an exceptional survey of experiments 
conducted in the last decade to test gender behavioral differences. After 
reviewing several public goods experiments they conclude that these 
experiments offer no clear evidence of a systematic difference between men and 
women.  
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Further, they suggest that the contradictory results of the prisoner’s dilemma, 
public goods, and ultimatum experiments may be caused by failure to control for 
important environmental factors that might confound basic gender differences. In 
their view, the dictator experiment offers a simpler design that removes possible 
confounding factors such as considerations of strategic risk. 
 
They find that as responders in ultimatum experiments and in dictator games, 
systematic differences are revealed, i.e., the choices women make are less 
individually-oriented and more socially-oriented. 
 
So how can we reconcile the fact that gender differences seem so pronounced in 
certain domains and invisible in others? The only plausible answer to this 
question may be is that: 
Findings from gender research mirror the inductive conclusions one 
is likely to draw from daily experience: Men do not consistently act 
one way and women another, sometimes gender matters, and 
sometimes it does not. 
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5. Experimental Design 
 
A total of 146 (76 females and 70 males) subjects participated in this study. 
Graduate and undergraduate students were recruited from the student population 
at International Institute of Islamic Economics, International Islamic University, 
Islamabad. 
 
There were three sessions, one held on 20 May 2004 (comprising 24 
undergraduate male students), one on 21 May 2004 (comprising 76 graduate 
female students) and one on 22 May 2004 (comprising 46 graduate male 
students). In each session half of the subjects made offers and the remaining half 
accepted or rejected these offers. 
 
Subjects were paid in the form of 5 bonus marks for participating (the worth of 
these marks is assumed to be high enough for the students to induce them to 
participate in the game), and they bargained over Rs. 50 in all the sessions. 
 
All of the experimental sessions were conducted in large classrooms where there 
was plenty of room for subjects to spread out for privacy. All sessions had two 
rounds. In the first round, the proposers were handed over a simple 
questionnaire which required them to state what they expected is the minimum 
offer they should make that would be acceptable to the responder. Similarly, the 
responders were asked to state the minimum acceptable offer (MAO) that they 
will accept from the proposer.  
 
In the second round, the proposers were handed over an envelope containing 
money along with another envelope in which they could put the amount they 
intended to give to the responder. 
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Once the proposers had made their decisions, they handed over the responders’ 
envelopes to the experimenter who distributed these envelopes between the 
responders randomly (use of a random number list was made in this respect).  
 
Each responder after considering the offer made by the proposer decided 
whether to keep the envelope (in case of acceptance) or return it to the 
experimenter (in case of rejection). The proposers whose offers were rejected 
then returned their envelopes so that in case of rejection both the parties got 
nothing.
 25 
6. Results 
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The mean offer for the entire group of subjects (proposers) is Rs. 22.88 (46% of 
the total amount) thus indicating that people are more generous than what 
economists predict. Further, this result is consistent with the standard 
experimental results. The offers are reported in Table 1 (Annexure), as well as, 
the following figure. 
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The rejection rate for all the 
responders is 23.29%. It can be 
seen from Table 2 (Annexure) that 
most of the rejections by responders 
are for the offers that are below the 
50% division. However, in some 
cases fair and hyper-fair were also 
rejected by the responders in cases 
where they expected more 
generosity from the proposers. This rejection rate figure is also compatible with 
experimental results found in many of the above-mentioned studies. 
 
 
The proportion of proposers who were generous due to their preference for 
fairness (who gave more than what they thought would be acceptable to the 
responder) is 27.4%. The remaining 
proposers offer generously due to 
fear of rejection. Again this is 
analogous to the experimental 
theory that generosity on part of the 
proposers is mainly attributable to 
the fear that the offer will be rejected 
and they would get nothing. Fairness 
only plays a smaller part in this 
behavior. 
 
Regarding differences in proposer behavior, males offered Rs. 21.57 (43% of the 
pie) to the responders while females offered Rs. 24.08 (48% of the total amount) 
Fairness among Proposers
72.60
27.40
Overall Rejection Rate
23.29
76.71
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to their counterparts. The details of these offers are given in Tables 3 and 4 
(Annexure). The same are reported for the two genders in the following figures. 
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The rejection rates across genders vary by a considerable amount. The rejection 
rate for males is 40% while that for females is almost 8%. This difference in 
rejection is, may be, attributable to the fact that females on average offer higher 
shares as compared to males. This is evident from the data reported in the tables 
that most of the offers rejected by males lie in the 5-15 rupees range (10-30% 
share of the pie). Further, the variance in female offers is much lesser (2.81) as 
compared to males (7.45). This tells us that female offers do not exhibit much 
variation around the mean offer. The same can not be concluded for males.  
 
The proportion of proposers exhibiting fairness is also considerably different with 
female proposers exhibiting a greater level of fairness as compared to males. 
Almost 32% of the females demonstrated fairness in their offers to the 
responders as compared to nearly 23% of the males. However, a considerable 
amount of proposers in both genders had fear of rejection as the main ingredient 
in their behavior. This fear of rejection is well founded, especially in males where 
many of the unfair offers were rejected. 
 
  
 
6.2 Inferential Statistics 
 
Male Rejection Rates
60
40
Female Rejection Rates
92.11
7.89
Fairness in Female Proposers
68.4231.58
Fairness in Male Proposers
77.14
22.86
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In the following paragraphs we report the results of various tests carried out in 
respect of testing the hypothesis stated in the beginning. 
 
1. Are people generally self interested? 
 
In order to test whether people systematically make generous offers or not we 
applied the t-test of significance. The hypothesis in this case is that whether 
mean offer is significantly different from Rs. 5 (10% of the pie and the 
minimum amount that the proposer can offer to the responder as suggested 
by economists). The hypothesis is rejected at 5% level of significance (the 
results are reported in Table 5 of the annexure). Thus we can conclude that 
people do not behave selfishly as proposed by game theorists. 
 
2. If people tend to be generous, what is the motive? 
 
In this respect we use the one-tailed z-test of proportions to test the 
hypothesis that proportion of fair offers is not significantly different from 0.5, 
i.e., we expect that taste for fairness and fear of rejection figure equally in the 
proposer behavior. Again, the hypothesis is rejected at 2% level of 
significance. The results are reported in Table 6 of the annexure. In this case 
we can conclude that fairness has a lesser role to play in people’s decisions 
as compared to fear of rejection. 
 
3. Is there any behavioral difference in bargaining between males and 
females? 
 
a. Are females more generous than males? 
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In this case we apply the tests of equality of mean and medians 
(Tables 7 and 8 of annexure). The hypothesis is that both males and 
females make equal offers on average. The mean test shows that the 
difference between mean offers is significant thus indicating that on 
average, male proposers offer less than what female proposers offer. 
This may show that females are more generous than males. However, 
the median test indicates that median offers across genders are the 
same. 
 
In addition we also regress offers made on the gender of the proposer 
(dummy variable). The detailed results are reported in Table 9 of the 
annexure. The regression indicates that gender has a significant effect 
on the mean offer (significant t-statistic and low p-value). The intercept 
(21.57) gives male mean offer whereas the coefficient of DUMMYMF 
(2.51) gives the difference between the male mean offer and the 
female mean offer. 
 
Another test that we run is the equality of variance test (Table 10 of 
annexure). The results indicate that male offers have a greater 
variance than that of female offers. Further, the difference in two 
variances is significant (low p-values of four out of five tests). 
Therefore, we can conclude that women deviate from the generous 
offers less frequently than males. 
 
Since we have found that females display a more generous behavior 
than males so we proceed to the next step, i.e., 
 
b. What is the motive of female generosity? 
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In this case we test whether females are generous because they have 
a greater taste for fairness as compared to men or do they have a 
greater fear of rejection which causes them to offer generously. Again 
we use the z-test of proportions to test the hypothesis that proportion 
of fair offers made by females is equal to that of males. The results 
(reported in Table 11 of the annexure) indicate that the hypothesis is 
accepted at 5% level of significance, i.e., females offer more 
generously not due to the reason that they are more fair or that the fear 
rejection more than the males. 
 
c. Are females more reciprocal than males? 
 
In this case we fit a Logit model for regressing acceptance rates for 
males and females (dummy variable) on the offer made by each 
gender respectively. The results (Tables 12 and 13 of annexure) 
indicate that female offer has an insignificant effect on 
rejection/acceptance. i.e., amount of offer insignificantly explains 
rejection/acceptance behavior of the respondents. On the contrary, 
male offer has a significant effect on rejection/acceptance. i.e., amount 
of offer significantly explains rejection/acceptance behavior of the 
respondents. 
 
Further, in order to determine gender based differences in behavior, 
probabilities of accepting an offer are calculated for each gender 
(Table 14).  The information is also given in the following figure. 
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As can be seen from the above figure, the probability of females 
accepting a given offer is greater than that of males, for all offers. This 
indicates that female responders are more likely to accept both unfair 
and fair offers than males. This result seems to be consistent with the 
finding that males have a higher rejection rate than females.  Also, it is 
important to note that the probability of female accepting an unfair offer 
is far greater than males (for example, the chances of a female 
accepting a 10%, 20% and 30% shares is nine, six and three times 
greater than that for males, respectively). 
 
Combining the lower rejection rates and higher acceptance 
probabilities of females for unfair offers, we can conclude that females 
are not necessarily more reciprocal than males.
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7. Conclusion 
 
The most elementary result, also verified by many other experimental studies, is 
that people in general are not selfish, at least not to the extent that economists 
assume.  This calls for a serious rethinking by economists since the existing 
neoclassical microeconomic theory is firmly based on the assumption of self 
interested economic agents. In this respect, we would like to point out that 
Muslim economists throughout the world can make a significant contribution 
since they have the orientation to a relatively different concept of human behavior 
revealed in the divine sources. 
 
Secondly, people tend to be more giving in negotiations. However, this 
generosity is mainly grounded on their fear of rejection rather than any specific 
liking for fairness. Again this is a replication of previous studies. However, at the 
start of this study, we were of the view that the people of an Islamic society, in 
general, and students of Islamic University, Islamabad, in particular, would show 
a greater concern for fairness rather than fear of rejection, especially since they 
go through. As is evident, the results of this study prove these views wrong. 
Further, this fear of rejection was very realistic, particularly, in case of males 
where the rejection rates for unfair offers were very high. 
 
Lastly, regarding gender differences, we have found females to be more 
generous than males. However, the reason for this generosity could not be 
found, since there was no significant difference in the degree of fairness or fear 
of rejection in the two genders. May be economists should look towards 
psychological motives rather than purely economic motives for the observed 
differences in behavior. We also did not find any conclusive evidence that 
females are more reciprocal than males. 
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Annexure  
Table 1: OFFERS, EXPECTED MAOs AND MAOs FOR THE ENTIRE GROUP 
 
Game Expected 
MAO 
MAO Offer Game Expected 
MAO 
MAO Offer 
01 20 15 20 38 25 25 25 
02 25 25 30 39 5 20 20 
03 25 25 25 40 20 25 20 
04 25 25 25 41 20 25 20 
05 20 15 20 42 30 35 30 
06 20 10 20 43 20 25 25 
07 20 25 25 44 15 30 15 
08 10 15 15 45 20 30 30 
09 20 25 25 46 5 15 10 
10 20 25 25 47 5 10 30 
11 25 25 30 48 15 35 15 
12 15 20 20 49 25 20 25 
13 25 25 25 50 5 10 5 
14 25 25 25 51 5 25 5 
15 20 25 25 52 25 25 25 
16 25 5 25 53 30 25 30 
17 20 25 25 54 25 25 25 
18 25 30 25 55 5 0 20 
19 25 25 25 56 15 25 15 
20 25 25 25 57 30 20 30 
21 25 25 25 58 25 15 25 
22 25 25 25 59 25 25 25 
23 25 25 25 60 15 20 15 
24 20 25 20 61 5 30 10 
25 25 25 25 62 30 5 30 
26 25 25 25 63 25 25 25 
27 25 25 25 64 25 25 25 
28 25 25 25 65 25 20 25 
29 25 25 25 66 25 25 25 
30 25 25 25 67 20 15 20 
31 25 25 20 68 30 50 30 
32 20 25 25 69 25 25 25 
33 20 25 25 70 25 15 25 
34 25 20 25 71 30 5 30 
35 25 25 25 72 10 25 10 
36 25 25 20 73 10 25 15 
37 20 50 25     
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Table 2: ACCEPTANCE / REJECTION AND FAIRNESS / FEAR OF 
REJECTION 
 
Game Offer Accepted 
/Rejected 
Fairness Game Offer Accepted 
/Rejected 
Fairness 
1 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 38 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
2 30 Accepted Fair 39 20 Accepted Fair 
3 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 40 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
4 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 41 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
5 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 42 30 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
6 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 43 25 Accepted Fair 
7 25 Accepted Fair 44 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
8 15 Accepted Fair 45 30 Accepted Fair 
9 25 Accepted Fair 46 10 Rejected Fair 
10 25 Accepted Fair 47 30 Accepted Fair 
11 30 Accepted Fair 48 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
12 20 Accepted Fair 49 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
13 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 50 5 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
14 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 51 5 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
15 25 Accepted Fair 52 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
16 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 53 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
17 25 Accepted Fair 54 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
18 25 Rejected Fear of Rejection 55 20 Accepted Fair 
19 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 56 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
20 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 57 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
21 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 58 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
22 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 59 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
23 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 60 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
24 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 61 10 Rejected Fair 
25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 62 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
26 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 63 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
27 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 64 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
28 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 65 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
29 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 66 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
30 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 67 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
31 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 68 30 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
32 25 Accepted Fair 69 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
33 25 Accepted Fair 70 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
34 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 71 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
35 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 72 10 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
36 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 73 15 Rejected Fair 
37 25 Accepted Fair     
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Table 3: DATA REGARDING MALES 
 
Game Expected 
MAO 
MAO Offer Accepted / Rejected Fairness 
1 5 20 20 Accepted Fair 
2 20 25 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
3 20 25 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
4 30 35 30 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
5 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
6 15 30 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
7 20 30 30 Accepted Fair 
8 5 15 10 Rejected Fair 
9 5 10 30 Accepted Fair 
10 15 35 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
11 25 20 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
12 5 10 5 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
13 5 25 5 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
14 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
15 30 25 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
16 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
17 5 0 20 Accepted Fair 
18 15 25 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
19 30 20 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
20 25 15 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
21 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
22 15 20 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
23 5 30 10 Rejected Fair 
24 30 5 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
25 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
26 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
27 25 20 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
28 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
29 20 15 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
30 30 50 30 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
31 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
32 25 15 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
33 30 5 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
34 10 25 10 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
35 10 25 15 Rejected Fair 
 
 46 
Table 4: DATA REGARDING FEMALES 
 
Game Expected MAO MAO Offer Accepted / Rejected Fairness 
1 20 15 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
2 25 25 30 Accepted Fair 
3 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
4 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
5 20 15 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
6 20 10 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
7 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
8 10 15 15 Accepted Fair 
9 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
10 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
11 25 25 30 Accepted Fair 
12 15 20 20 Accepted Fair 
13 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
14 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
15 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
16 25 5 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
17 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
18 25 30 25 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
19 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
20 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
21 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
22 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
23 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
24 20 25 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
25 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
26 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
27 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
28 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
29 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
30 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
31 25 25 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
32 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
33 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
34 25 20 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
35 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
36 25 25 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
37 20 50 25 Accepted Fair 
38 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
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Table 5: TEST OF SIGNIFICANCE, i.e., ARE OFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY 
DIFFERENT FROM PURELY SELFISH OFFERS 
 
OVERALLMEANOFFER 22.88 
Hypothesised Value 5 
 
 
SE 5.646890013 
t-statistic 3.166344653 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: TEST FOR EQUALITY OF FAIRNESS AND FEAR OF REJECTION IN 
DECISION MAKING 
 
OVERALLFAIRNESS 27.40% 
Hypothesised Value 50.00% 
 
 
SE = 0.058520574 
 
 
Z = -3.862351069 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: TEST FOR EQUALITY OF MEANS BETWEEN SERIES 
 
Included observations: 38 
     
Method df Value Probability 
t-test 71 1.930975 0.0575 
Anova F-statistic (1, 71) 3.728664 0.0575 
     
     
Analysis of Variance 
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
     
Between 1 114.5558 114.5558 
Within 71 2181.335 30.72302 
     
Total 72 2295.890 31.88737 
     
     
Category Statistics 
    Std. Err. 
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean 
MALE 35 21.57143 7.452934 1.259776 
FEMALE 38 24.07895 2.812920 0.456316 
All 73 22.87671 5.646890 0.660918 
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Table 8: TEST FOR EQUALITY OF MEDIANS BETWEEN SERIES 
 
Included observations: 38 
      
Method df Value Probability 
 
      
Wilcoxon / Mann-Whitney 0.877841 0.3800  
Med. Chi-square 1 4.770483 0.0290  
Adj. Med. Chi-square 1 3.398325 0.0653  
Kruskal-Wallis 1 0.942449 0.3316  
van der Waerden 1 0.996805 0.3181  
      
      
Category Statistics 
   > Overall   
Variable Count Median Median Mean Rank Mean Score 
MALE 35 25.00000 8 34.71429 -0.122622 
FEMALE 38 25.00000 2 39.10526 0.075781 
All 73 25.00000 10 37.00000 -0.019344 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: REGRESSION RESULTS WHEN OFFERS ARE REGRESSED OVER 
GENDER 
 
Dependent Variable: OFFER 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 73 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 21.57143 0.936910 23.02401 0.0000 
DUMMYMF 2.507519 1.298577 1.930975 0.0575 
R-squared 0.049896     Mean dependent var 22.87671 
Adjusted R-squared 0.036514     S.D. dependent var 5.646890 
S.E. of regression 5.542835     Akaike info criterion 6.289904 
Sum squared resid 2181.335     Schwarz criterion 6.352657 
Log likelihood -227.5815     F-statistic 3.728664 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.088727     Prob(F-statistic) 0.057479 
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Table 10: TEST FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCE BETWEEN SERIES 
 
Included observations: 38 
      
Method df Value Probability  
      
F-test (37, 34) 7.020043 0.0000  
Siegel-Tukey (1, 71) 0.364897 0.5477  
Bartlett 1 29.63959 0.0000  
Levene (1, 71) 33.68024 0.0000  
Brown-Forsythe (1, 71) 16.79195 0.0001  
      
      
Category Statistics 
   Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean 
Tukey- 
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank 
MALE 35 7.452934 6.204082 5.714286 35.57143 
FEMALE 38 2.812920 1.980609 1.447368 38.31579 
All 73 5.646890 4.005562 3.493151 37.00000 
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  5.542835 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: TEST FOR EQUALITY OF PROPORTIONS BETWEEN SERIES 
 
FEMALEFAIRNESS 0.32 
FEMALEFEAR 0.68 
FEMALENO 38 
MALEFAIRNESS 0.23 
MALEFEAR 0.77 
MALENO 35 
 
 
SE = 0.103556076 
 
 
Z = 0.842230106 
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Table 12: LOGIT MODEL WHERE ACCEPTANCE RATES ARE REGRESSED 
OVER OFFER (MALE) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPTANCEMALE 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Date: 06/06/04   Time: 13:05 
Sample: 1 35 
Included observations: 35 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -6.226753 2.229092 -2.793404 0.0052 
MALE 0.310377 0.100290 3.094794 0.0020 
Mean dependent var 0.600000     S.D. dependent var 0.497050 
S.E. of regression 0.331538     Akaike info criterion 0.882334 
Sum squared resid 3.627284     Schwarz criterion 0.971211 
Log likelihood -13.44084     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.913014 
Restr. log likelihood -23.55541     Avg. log likelihood -0.384024 
LR statistic (1 df) 20.22913     McFadden R-squared 0.429395 
Probability(LR stat) 6.87E-06    
Obs with Dep=0 14      Total obs 35 
Obs with Dep=1 21    
 
 
 
 
Table 13: LOGIT MODEL WHERE ACCEPTANCE RATES ARE REGRESSED 
OVER OFFER (FEMALE) 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ACCEPTANCEFEMALE 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Included observations: 38 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.  
C -3.763791 4.147619 -0.907458 0.3642 
FEMALE 0.268950 0.184757 1.455696 0.1455 
Mean dependent var 0.921053     S.D. dependent var 0.273276 
S.E. of regression 0.273161     Akaike info criterion 0.603601 
Sum squared resid 2.686211     Schwarz criterion 0.689790 
Log likelihood -9.468417     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.634266 
Restr. log likelihood -10.49526     Avg. log likelihood -0.249169 
LR statistic (1 df) 2.053676     McFadden R-squared 0.097838 
Probability(LR stat) 0.151839    
Obs with Dep=0 3      Total obs 38 
Obs with Dep=1 35    
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Table 14: PROBAILITIES FOR MALES AND FEMALES OF ACCEPTING AN 
OFFER 
 
 
Offer Males Females 
0 0.001971961 0.022669798 
5 0.009240572 0.081732202 
10 0.042169121 0.254587911 
15 0.172059919 0.567205585 
20 0.495196898 0.834133332 
25 0.822396923 0.950732073 
30 0.956251223 0.986675135 
35 0.990400915 0.996492923 
40 0.997950948 0.999083662 
45 0.99956521 0.999761036 
50 0.999907859 0.999937714 
 
 
